

**Regional Inequalities in Israel:
Jews and Palestinians in Israel's Districts, 1995-2012***

Yinon Cohen, Columbia University**

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**Author's address: Department of Sociology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. email address: yc2444@columbia.edu.

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1. Data Sources and Availability

The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) is responsible for collecting and disseminating data regarding the country's population and territory. It does so on the basis of periodical surveys focusing on a variety of subjects (e.g., labor force surveys, expenditure surveys, income surveys), administrative data (e.g., population registry), as well as population censuses that were conducted in 1948, 1961, 1972, 1983, 1995, and 2008.

Population and demographic estimates for the entire country and by geographic divisions are based on population censuses and on the changes that occurred in the population after the Censuses, as recorded in the Population Register. The Israeli population is defined on the basis of the permanent (de jure) population, and consists of Israeli citizens and permanent residents (including those who have been out of the country for less than one year). Not included are the estimated 202,000 labor migrants and 54,000 asylum seekers who entered Israel without entry visa, even if they have resided in Israel for over a year (CBS 2013: 30).

Until the 1995 census, all information was collected from households. The 2008 census combined administrative data with information obtained by traditional methods. *The Israeli Statistical Abstract*, the flagship publication of the CBS, publishes an annual portrait of Israel's population, economy and society, based on the various surveys, administrative records, and information provided by various governmental organizations. The statistical abstract is bilingual (Hebrew and English) and available online at <http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader>. In addition to a full census count, a representative sample of approximately 20% of the population is conducted in each census year to provide detailed demographic, social and economic information about the population. Both the demographic and geographical versions of the 20% population censuses are available for researchers.

Much of the data presented in the following pages, are thus based on our analysis of the 20% geographic public use files of the 1995 and 2008 (PUF) censuses. Maps and figures are taken from the website of the Statistical Abstract. Some tables are based on published data in the Israeli Statistical Abstracts of various years (mostly 1996 and 2013), as well as on some other CBS publications.

CBS data and surveys are considered to be professionally run and of high quality. However, the coverage of Bedouins living in small communities in the south is partial. The CBS is an official Israeli unit in the Prime Minister's Office and as such reflects the policies of the Israeli government with respect to Israel's territory and population. This of course has consequences for the way Israel counts its population and the information it collects about its residents.

The recognized international borders of contemporary Israel are those specified in the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors; these borders, with

some minor modifications, were consolidated and received wider international legitimation in later years following peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and a UN-approved agreement with Lebanon. However, the 1949 borders of Israel, known more commonly as the 1967 borders, or the “Green Line,” were in effect for only 18 years, until 1967. Following the 1967 war, Israel occupied the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. At present, the West Bank and the Golan Heights are still under Israeli occupation. Moreover, during the past 46 years Israel has been transferring some of its own Jewish population to these occupied areas. At the end of 2012, about 531,000 Israeli Jewish settlers lived in the occupied West Bank (including an estimated 190,000 in East Jerusalem, which was unilaterally annexed by Israel immediately after the 1967 War). An additional 19,000 settlers reside in the annexed Golan Heights.

Israel considers its population to include all those residing within the 1967 borders, plus all those residing in Jewish settlements in the West Bank (341,400 at the end of 2012), as well as all those (both Jews and Palestinian-Arabs) residing in annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. By contrast, the international community does not consider the occupied West Bank and the Golan Heights to be part of Israel, nor does it recognize the annexation of East Jerusalem or consider the settler population in the Occupied Territories to be part of Israel. However, because of the way Israel collects and publishes data on its own population, it has not been possible to obtain statistics on all characteristics of the Israeli population that excludes all settlers, especially those residing in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. This being the case, the OECD includes a note in all tables pertaining to Israel, which states: “For technical reasons, this table uses Israel’s official statistics, which include data relating to the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank” (OECD, 2010).

Israel’s current territory is divided into six administrative districts plus one “area.” Each of the six districts is divided into sub-districts and natural areas (Map 1). At present, there are 15 sub-districts and 51 natural areas (up from 50 in 1995). The districts and sub-districts are defined according to the official administrative division of Israel, which is used by many Israeli ministries and governmental bodies, including the CBS.¹ This report will therefore follow this division, providing most information at the district level.

Four of the districts cover territory entirely within the “Green Line” (the districts of Tel Aviv, Haifa, Central, and the South). The Northern and Jerusalem districts were enlarged following the 1967 war to include the territories Israel unilaterally annexed in the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. A new “area,” called the “Judah and Samaria area” by Israel, and in this report the West Bank, includes the occupied West Bank, but excludes 70 squared km that were annexed to Jerusalem.² The Israeli Statistical Abstract includes some demographic, social and economic information by districts, treating the West Bank

¹ Some ministries use other divisions (e.g. municipalities) for some purposes.

² Note that Map 1, being an official Israeli map, includes the 1967 borders for most of the West Bank (but not in Jerusalem or the Golan Heights). Other Israeli maps, most notably those available at schools and other state institutions, do not show the 1967 borders between Israel and the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

as a district. Likewise, the 20% public use geographic file makes it possible to present and compare the Israeli population by seven districts, thereby enabling us to compare the settler population in the West Bank (not including those in East Jerusalem)³ to the population in Israel's other six districts, something that has not been done by previous research that had addressed regional inequalities in Israel (Portnov and Erell 2003).⁴


The occupation, annexation of East Jerusalem and Golan Heights, and the settlement movement, emanating from the 1967 war have all influenced the complex way Israel counts its population. Yet many of the current territorial issues within Israel, especially those pertaining to Israel's Palestinian citizens⁵, have their roots in the 1948 war and its aftermath. This being the case, before turning to describe the demographic and socioeconomic trends in Israel's districts since 1995, the next section provides some necessary historical background focusing on the 1948 war, Israel's land regime and policies, and immigration trends since 1948.

³ It is not possible, as it is with respect to the West Bank, to provide socioeconomic characteristics for the settler population of East Jerusalem (estimated by Betzelem at the end of 2011 at 190,423) and the Golan Heights (estimated by the CBS [2013] at the end of 2012 at 18,900 (Table 2.16) or 20,200 (Table 2.17). Virtually no data are reported separately in CBS publications or in the geographic public use samples of the censuses for the two parts of Jerusalem.

⁴ Until 1996, Israel collected and published some information on the Palestinian population under occupation, a practice that was stopped following the Oslo agreements and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. This report will therefore not discuss the Palestinian-Arab population of the West Bank, with the exception of those residing in East Jerusalem, nor the territorial disputes over land, water and other resources between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in West Bank.

⁵ In the interest of brevity, this report refers to the Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel (as well as to the non-citizens Palestinian residents of occupied East Jerusalem) as "Palestinians."

Map 1. Districts, Sub-Districts and Natural Regions



Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel no. 64, 2013 (map 1.1)

2. Historical Background

At the end of the 19th century, under Ottoman Empire rule, the territory of Palestine was divided among several administrative districts, notably the *Vilayet* of Beirut and the *Sanjak* of Jerusalem. According to Kimmerling (2001: 35), in 1888 Jews composed 6% of the population in the area, holding 0.3% of the land. In 1922, after the occupation of Palestine by the British, the Jewish population comprised 84,000, accounting for 11% of the total population, holding 3.2% of the land. Just before the 1948 war, following waves of Jewish immigration, the Jewish population of Palestine reached 33%, yet still held no more than 7% of Mandatory Palestine's 26.3 million dunams of land. In the territory that would become Israel in 1949, between 780,000 and 900,000 Palestinians,⁶ and 630,000 Jews resided in 1947. Major demographic and geographic changes in Israel occurred during the 1948 war and the several years of Israeli state legislation and military actions that followed it. The war reshaped the borders of the new Israeli state as well as the composition of the population and settlements in its territory.

In 1947, just before the war, there were about 350 Jewish settlements and about 700 Palestinian settlements in the territory later to be under Israeli jurisdiction. During the 1948 war, which lasted well into 1949, at least 369⁷ Palestinian villages were destroyed and about 750,000 Palestinians were displaced from their land, becoming refugees (Morris 1987). A similar number of Jews, Holocaust survivors and Jews from Arab countries, were brought to Israel during the years 1948-1951. These two shifts completely transformed the demographic, national and ethnic composition of Israel's population, without changing the overall population size, as the new Jewish immigrants "replaced" the displaced Palestinians (Cohen, 2002). During the following 15 years, until 1967, an additional 700,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in Israel, mostly from Arab countries in the Middle East.

Most of the new Jewish immigrants were settled by the new government on lands previously held or used by Palestinians, so that 350 of the 370 new Jewish settlements established soon after 1948 were built upon or in proximity to Palestinian villages that had been vacated during the war (Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006: 137), while 120,000 Jewish immigrants who arrived during 1948-51 were housed in vacant Palestinian houses in cities and villages occupied during the war (Cohen, 2002).

After the 1948 war, about 160,000 Palestinians remained in Israel and received Israeli citizenship. Yet they lost 40-60% of the land they possessed prior to the war (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2006: 139). The war ended with Israel controlling 78% of British Palestine's area. Yet, officially, land owned by Jewish individuals and organizations (notably the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency) amounted to only 8.5% of the area under Israeli jurisdiction (Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006: 138). Adding the land formerly owned by the British Mandate and inherited by Israel, soon after the 1948 war, the state was owner of 13.5% of the land it occupied (Forman and Kedar, 2004). The rest of the land was under Palestinian ownership, but many did not have proper documentation for their

⁶ See Bachi (1974) for the low estimate and Zochrot (<http://zochrot.org>), based on Abu Sitta (2004) for the high estimate.

⁷ Zochrot (<http://zochrot.org>), based on Abu Sitta (2004) lists 530 destroyed Palestinian villages.

ownership. Soon after the war, the State of Israel initiated a 'nationalization' process, during which lands owned by Palestinians were confiscated and transferred either to the Jewish National Fund (JNF) or directly to the hands of the state.⁸ This legal and administrative process, which ended in 1960 with the establishment of the Israeli Land Administration (ILA, in Hebrew: *Rashut Mekarke'ei Yisrael*), made the state the owner of 93% of the land of its judicial territory.

With the establishment of the Israeli Land Administration (ILA) in 1960, the legal process of land confiscation was, for the most part, completed, creating a category of “State Lands” (in Hebrew: *admot medina*), which referred to all lands that belong either to the state or to the JNF. Any transfer of ownership—except among the partners—was restricted, thus creating a closed reservoir of lands. As late as 2009, the ILA mentioned in its annual report that one of its roles is “to buy lands and to aid the state in confiscating lands by all legal means, including for environmental causes” (ILA 2009). At present, The ILA, uniting the territorial assets owned by the state and the Jewish National Fund, manages 93% of the 22 million dunams that are Israel's territory (including East Jerusalem, but not the rest of the occupied West Bank). In other words, the law states that all State Lands, 93% of the Israeli territory, cannot be sold but only leased. Moreover, according to the bi-laws of the JNF, which are applicable to 13% of the “State Lands,” leasing land to non-Jews is prohibited.⁹ Due to the legal and institutional involvement of the Jewish Agency and JNF (which are not part of the Israeli state, and can therefore follow policies favoring Jews), as well as the total Jewish domination of the land and planning systems, a leading Israeli geographer, Oren Yiftachel (2009), concludes that “Arab citizens are effectively prevented from residing in over 80% of Israel's territory. In those exact same areas, Diaspora Jews can purchase or lease land even if they are not citizens of the state.”¹⁰

Alongside the legal and administrative actions taken to control the land, Israel has aggressively followed a policy of de-facto “Judiazing the land” (Yiftachel 2006). This entailed a twofold strategy of confining the Palestinians in the villages in which they were living and dispersing the Jewish population across space. Initially, many of the immigrants, especially *Mizrahim* (Jews of Asian or African origin mostly from Arab countries), were dispersed in small agricultural localities (“*moshavim*”) across areas that

⁸ Israel applied the law of “*Mawat Land*” (literally meaning: “dead land”), an Ottoman judicial category which applies to all unregistered, uncultivated lands lacking an ownership that is established by law. The law stated that all such lands belong to the Ottoman Empire. The state of Israel reapplied this category, arguing that all unregistered land which is not cultivated is therefore Israeli land, by virtue of the *Mawat Laws*.

⁹ The JNF has recently agreed to sell to non-Jews for a limited time, ahead of a High Court discussion on three petitions calling on the ILA to stop restricting public tenders for JNF land to Jews (Jerusalem Post 6/10/2013).

¹⁰ In 2000 the High Court of Israel ruled that the ILA policy of leasing land only to Jews was discriminatory and illegal, calling for the equal right of all citizens to purchase or lease state land. Yet, as observed by Yiftachel nine years later (2009: 59), “this is yet to have an influence on Arab mobility or spatial equality.”

had been captured during the war and were located in the periphery. A few “development towns” – small towns of less than 50,000 inhabitants – were built nearby the rural *moshavim* to serve as local urban centers, eventually also providing a reservoir of blue-collar workers for the labor needs of (mostly Ashkenazi) Kibbutzim in their area.¹¹ Failing to develop into economic or cultural centers, development towns – most are located in the Northern and Southern districts – are currently among the poorest Jewish localities in Israel. That nearly 50 years after the end of mass migration from Arab countries, *Mizrahim* (now mostly second- and third-generation Israelis) are the vast majority of the population in these development towns is an indication that the ethnic cleavage within Jewish Israelis (between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim) is far from over.

That more than 700 new Jewish communities have been established in Israel since 1948, but only a handful of new Arab communities in the South, is one consequence of these laws and policies.

3. Israel’s settlement map

Proletarianization without urbanization

During the first part of the 20th century, when the British ruled Palestine, Palestinian society went through a significant process of urbanization that was halted in 1948 (Hassan 1987). The proportion Palestinians residing in cities increased from 27.4% in 1922 to 36.1% in 1946 (Gilbar 1987). During the 1948 war Palestinian urban centers such as *Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Lydda* and *Ramle*, were severely damaged and depopulated, all of them becoming Jewish cities with a negligible Palestinian minority and no Palestinian economic base. The rural population remaining in Israel did not fare better. After losing lands in the 1948 war and the subsequent confiscation of land by the state, former Palestinian farmers were forced into a rapid proletarianization. With no land to cultivate, the farmer-dominated Palestinian population of Israel has been transformed into a worker-dominated population. Living in densely overpopulated villages (some absorbed Palestinian refugees from other villages), without an industrial infrastructure, they were forced to seek employment outside their villages.

The Palestinian population residing in Palestinian villages in Israel had a high rate of natural increase, so thousands, and in some cases tens of thousands, now populate villages that had a few hundred inhabitants in 1949. Yet due to the ILA national land allocation policy, the municipal boundaries of Palestinian villages have remained largely the same in the past six decades. While these villages are defined by the CBS as “urban” in terms of population size (having more than 2,000 inhabitants), they lack most of the characteristics of urban areas in terms of urban development, infrastructure and cultural and educational institutions. Villages considered to be rural in 1960 became urban only because of natural population growth, without going through a profound urbanization process. They are, in a sense, bloated villages. The proportion of Palestinian Israelis living in “urban localities” increased from 63.6% in 1961 to 94.6% in 2012 (the respective figures among Jews are 87.0% and 90.2%). The only thing this means is that in 2012 the vast majority of Israeli-Palestinians resided in localities (99 out of 135) with more than 2,000 inhabitants (Table 1). Nearly half (47.5%) of Israeli Palestinians (but

¹¹ See Sharon (2006) for Israel’s plans for *Moshevim* and development towns during the 1950s.

only 23.3% of Jews) live in localities that have 10,000-50,000 inhabitants (CBS, 2013, Table 2.21). Evidently, the Palestinian proletarianization process lacked essential elements: city migration or urbanization. Palestinian villagers did not migrate to the cities in large numbers but commuted to Jewish areas looking for employment possibilities.

Table 1. Urban (pop. 2,000 or more) and Rural Localities (pop. less than 2000) by Year

	1961			1995			2012		
	All	Jewish	Palst.	All	Jewish	Palst.	All	Jewish	Palst.
Total	873	771	109	1185	1067	127	1200	1074	135
N of Urban	104	76	34	192	113	87	243	152	99
N of Rural	769	695	75	993	955	40	957	922	36
% Urban Pop	84.3	87.0	63.6	90.9	90.6	91.9	91.4	90.2	94.6

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel no. 64, 2013 (Table 2.21).

¹Mixed localities are counted twice: as Jewish and as Arab localities.

There were 7 mixed localities in 1961 and 9 in 1995 and 2012.

Not only have Palestinians lost most of the land they owned, the land controlled by their municipalities is severely restricted. Currently, about 97% of all Israel's land area is under Jewish municipal control (Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006: 144). Palestinian Israelis, who account for over 20% of Israel's population, control only 2.7% of the state's municipal jurisdictions and hold 3.5% of the land in private ownership and another 0.3-0.5% in leased land (Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006: 135). In the past two decades, many Palestinian localities have applied to the ILA with requests to redraw their municipal boundaries, but most have been left unanswered. As mentioned above, the municipal boundaries of Palestinian localities in Israel have largely remained the same throughout the past 65 years underscoring Israel's policy of uneven land allocation (Kedar and Yiftachel, 2006: 135).

Palestinian villages are not the only localities requesting to enlarge their municipal boundaries. Disputes over municipal boundaries are increasingly common among Jewish localities seeking to increase their tax revenues. Several Mizrahi development towns requested that their municipal boundaries be redrawn to include industrial areas located just beyond their municipal boundaries. Businesses located in these industrial areas, mostly traditional technology manufacturing plants, pay local taxes to other municipalities, while most blue-collar workers in these plants are inhabitants of the Mizrahi development towns. The poverty of development towns is in part due to the demarcation of municipal boundaries that reflect the subordinate position of Mizrahi and their communities in Israel (Azulai et al. 2009).

“Unrecognized” Villages

The only exception to the ILA policy towards non-Jewish citizens – restricting the development of any new or existing settlement – is the forced relocation of Bedouin in the Negev (Yiftachel, 2009). In 2013, there are about 200,000 Bedouin living in the South of Israel (the vast majority of the 216,200 Palestinians in the Southern district are

Bedouin).¹² About 54,000 of these Bedouin live in an estimated 45 “unrecognized villages,” and another 150,000 live in 7 towns (established by the state in the *Beer Sheva* metropolitan area) and in 11 Bedouin villages which received recognition in the past few years, but are still lacking the infrastructure of recognized localities.¹³

The major consequence of the ‘unrecognized’ status of the 45 Bedouin villages is their lack of basic infrastructures, such as connection to electricity grids, running water, a sewage system as well as medical clinics and public transportation. A report published by Physicians for Human Rights and the Local Council for the Unrecognized Villages in the Negev in 2008 shows that the state is depriving the 45 unrecognized villages of these basic services in order to force the Bedouin to move to other “recognized” settlements (PHR, 2008).

The status of “unrecognized villages” is a result of an ongoing land dispute between the State of Israel and the Bedouin. While the latter claim ownership of 550,000 dunam which comprise about 4% of the Negev region, the state claims that these same lands are “State Lands.” The present state policy regarding the Bedouins of the Negev and the unrecognized villages is outlined in the Praver-Begin Plan.¹⁴ The plan seeks to put an end to the land dispute between the state and the Bedouins by deeming their demand for land ownership illegal, based on the 1953 Land Acquisition Law, and offering compensation, in land or money, that does not accord with the claims of the Bedouin citizens. Further, the plan entails the forced transfer of about 30,000 residents of the unrecognized villages into several recognized villages, to be built by the state in a location unspecified at the time of writing. Some of the areas of Bedouin settlement to be evacuated according to the Praver-Begin Plan are already allocated for the development of military bases as well as for several Jewish localities. The land dispute between the State and the Bedouin population of the Negev is currently one of the major areas of Palestinian struggle in Israel.¹⁵

¹² For an official report by the ministry of construction on the demography of the Bedouins (in Hebrew), see http://www.moch.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/rashut_habeduyim/meyda_statisti/demografiya.pdf. There is some disagreement about the number of Bedouin in unrecognized villages. See Yiftachel (2013: 8) for a higher estimate.

¹³ For a Map of Unrecognized Bedouin-Arab Villages, Newly Recognized Villages and Planned Towns in the Negev, Israel, see: <http://goo.gl/maps/LXJzk>

¹⁴ The plan online (Hebrew): http://adalah.org/Public/files/Hebrew/Legal_Advocacy/Discriminatory_Laws/Praver_Plan_Bill_Hebrew.pdf

¹⁵ Before the establishment of the State of Israel, about 70,000 Bedouins lived in the Negev, but following the 1948 war only 12,000 or so remained in Israel; the rest fled or were expelled across the border to Jordan and Egypt. Under the directives of Israel’s first premier David Ben-Gurion, many of the Bedouins who stayed in Israel were uprooted from the lands they had inhabited in the western Negev and were concentrated in the north-eastern part of the Negev in a mostly barren area known as the *Siyag* zone, where most of the unrecognized villages are (Gordon 2012). Cleared of Palestinian Bedouin, the Negev’s most fertile areas were given in the 1950s to new *kibbutzim* and *moshavim*. It also enables the state to challenge the current Bedouin’s claim that

Segregation

Segregation by nationality is arguably the most salient feature of the Israeli settlement structure, the vast majority of localities being either Arab *or* Jewish, and defined as such by the CBS. There is a mixed population of Jews and Palestinians in only nine localities (out of 1,200), five of which were Palestinian cities prior to 1948 and became Judaized: *Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Ramle, and Haifa* which was a mixed city before 1948 (and occupied East Jerusalem). Currently, in these cities (with the possible exception of Haifa) Palestinian and Jewish families rarely live in the same building, street, or even neighborhood, and the Palestinian population is a minority. In *Tel Aviv-Yafo*, for example, commonly known as *Tel Aviv*, Palestinians are only 6.5% of the total city population, all residing in several neighborhoods in *Jaffa (Yafo)*. In Haifa, by contrast, Palestinians comprise one-fifth of the total city population, and they are less segregated than in Tel Aviv. Moreover, there are indications that Haifa is gradually regaining its pre-1948 status as an important Palestinian urban center (xxxxxxx). The other mixed localities include *Neve Shalom* (a small community – the only one in Israel – of Jewish and Palestinian families who are ideologically committed to living together) and *Nazareth-Ilit* (literally, *Upper Nazareth*), a development town on a hilltop overlooking adjacent Palestinian *Nazareth*. It was established in the 1960s as part of a plan to “Judaize the Galilee.” Starting in the 1970s, Palestinians from overpopulated *Nazareth* and other villages in the area moved to this Jewish town. By the end of 2012, Palestinians are 19.1% of the city’s population of nearly 41,000 (CBS website on communities). Sadly, the mayor of *Nazereth Ilit* does not view this demographic development as a chance to promote Palestinian/Jewish coexistence in a new mixed city. Rather, he calls to halt Arab immigration to *Nazereth Ilit* so it will be “Jewish forever” (*Haaretz* 9.8.2013).

The major areas of Palestinian settlements are in the Northern district of Israel, where 686,900 Palestinian citizens live in 83 localities up from 66 in 1961 (Table 3). The “new” 17 localities are villages that were “unrecognized” in 1961 and became recognized by 2012. As Kedar and Yiftachel explain, the Arab settlement map was “frozen” in 1948 and simultaneously surrounded by Jewish settlements, thus creating a “geography of enclaves” in which the vast majority of Israel's Palestinian citizens have remained.

The Jewish settlement map, especially in the North, South and the West Bank has thus proliferated. In fact, the number of Jewish localities in Israel, 1,074 in 2012, is among the highest in world given the population size (Tzfadia 2010). Most of the new Jewish localities are neither villages nor cities. The term “village” in Israel is reserved for Palestinian localities. Jewish localities, which are not cities, are classified into *kibbutzim, moshavim*, and a new category called “communal localities” (in Hebrew: *yishuvim Kehilatiyim*) which are, in fact, suburbs. Nearly 300 new localities, most of them “communal localities,” were established between 1961 and 1995, about half of them in

they had lived in the area (of the unrecognized villages) long before the establishment of the state of Israel.

the occupied West Bank and Golan Heights,¹⁶ and the vast majority of the rest in the Northern and Southern districts. Between 1995 and 2012 the rate of building new Jewish communities declined, at least within the Green Line. Moreover, some Jewish communities in the Tel Aviv district were consolidated, and 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 in the West Bank were dismantled. Consequently, the number of Jewish localities in 2012 listed in Table 3 (1,074) is only slightly larger than the number in 1995 (1,067). Yet the 2012 CBS figure for the West Bank does not include over 100 “outposts” which are considered “illegal” by the Israeli government, nor about 100 “individual settlements,” some in the North and most in the South which are often populated by one or two families. Since these settlements are smaller than 40 people, they are not recognize as “localities,” and are not included in the locality count by the CBS nor in Table 2. The reason for their establishment (with the assistance of the Jewish Agency and JNF) is primarily to keep lands in the North and especially in the South in Jewish control, lest these lands will be settled by Bedouins (Hamdan 2005).

Table 2. Number of Localities by Nationality, District and Year

	District	All ¹	Jewish	Palestinian
Total	1961	873	771	109
	1995	1185	1067	127
	2012	1200	1074	135
Jerusalem	1961	63	59	5
	1995	68	64	6
	2012	66	63	5
Northern	1961	293	229	66
	1995	407	329	81
	2012	417	337	83
Haifa	1961	97	75	23
	1995	97	75	23
	2012	94	76	19
Central	1961	231	219	14
	1995	233	226	9
	2012	239	232	9
Tel Aviv	1961	20	20	1
	1995	18	18	1
	2012	14	14	1
Southern	1961	169	169	0
	1995	224	217	7
	2012	247	229	18
West Bank	1961	0	0	0
	1995	138	138	0
	2012	123	123	0

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel no. 64, 2013 (Table 2.16)

¹Mixed localities are counted twice: as Jewish and as Arab localities.

¹⁶ Including 16 settlements that were established after 1967 in the Sinai desert and were dismantled in 1982, following the peace agreement with Egypt.

There are currently 14 Jewish cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Table 3), but only two Palestinian cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants in Israel: *Nazareth* in the North, and *Rahat* in the South. *Rahat* was established by the state in 1972 as part of a national program of resettlement of Bedouins in the Negev. Unlike *Nazareth*, *Rahat* lacks most characteristics of a “city.” It received municipal status in 1994 and is ranked in the lowest socioeconomic strata in Israel. Including *Nzaareth* and *Rahat*, there are ten Palestinian municipalities in Israel (out of 75 municipalities).

Segregation of Israeli Palestinians is maintained not only by physical separation but also through three major institutions: the educational system, the military, and the defense/security industry. The Israeli educational system is divided into two main tracks: the Jewish educational system (including secular, orthodox and ultraorthodox schools) where instruction is in Hebrew (or Yiddish in some ultraorthodox schools) and the non-Jewish educational system (including the Arab, Druze and Bedouin “sectors”) where instruction is in Arabic. Military service, which is obligatory for all Jewish citizens 18 years of age, is forbidden to most Palestinian-Arab citizens (it is obligatory for Druze, and possible for Bedouins, and recently for some Christians as well). Most Palestinians therefore do not have the necessary background and security clearance to be employed in the many firms that are connected, directly or indirectly, to the large defense security sector of the Israeli economy.¹⁷ Palestinians, on their part, have not demanded to be drafted to the military, nor have they lobbied for the integration of the Jewish and Arab educational systems. Rather, Palestinian Israelis demand that all rights and subsidies be divorced from military service, and that the Arab educational system be run and managed by Palestinian Israelis and receive equal funding per student as the Jewish system.

Table 3. Population (Thousands) in Cities with over 100,000 Inhabitants in 2012

District	City	1995	2012
Jerusalem	Jerusalem ¹	602.7	815.3
Tel Aviv	Tel Aviv-Yafo ²	409.0	414.6
	Holon	164.5	185.3
	Bene Brak ⁴	130.7	168.8
	Ramat Gan	128.7	148.4
	Bat Yam	138.5	129.4
Central	Rishon Lezion	165.2	235.1
	Petah Tikwa	151.3	213.9
	Netania	146.1	192.2
	Rehovot	85.2	120.9
Haifa	Haifa ³	259.5	272.2
Southern	Ashdod	129.8	214.9
	Beer Sheva	152.8	197.3
	Ashkelon	83.1	120.0

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel no. 64, 2013 (table 2.24)

¹Defined as a mixed city, Palestinians (mostly non-citizens) are 38.5% in 2012.

²Defined as a mixed city, Palestinians are 6.5% in 2012.

³Defined as a mixed city, Palestinians are 20.0% in 2012.

¹⁷ There is an important exception: the main economic activity of Druze men (after fulfilling their 3-year compulsory military service) is permanent employment in the military or border police.

⁴Most residents are ultraorthodox Jews.

Palestinians are not the only segregated population group in Israel. Ultraorthodox Jews, estimated at 10% of the entire population (and 12.5% of the Jewish population) in 2009 (Paltiel et al. 2012), tend to reside in segregated localities or neighborhoods, have their own educational system, and are exempted from military service if they enroll in *Yeshiva* (higher Jewish religious school). Unlike the Palestinians, the spatial segregation of the ultraorthodox is due to their own volition, they control their own educational system which is well funded by the state, and the state attempts, thus far with only limited success, to draft them to the military. Labor force participation of ultraorthodox men, due to lack of skills and fear of being drafted to the military if they are not in a *Yeshiva*, is as low as that of Palestinian women. Consequently, despite the many differences between the two communities, Palestinian and ultraorthodox localities and neighborhoods are the poorest in Israel.

4. Demographic Dynamics

According to the CBS, the Israeli population of nearly 8 million at the end of 2012 included 79.4% “Jews and others” and 20.6% “Arabs” (including about 190,000 Palestinian residents of annexed East Jerusalem). “Others” are 338,000 non-Arabs with no religious classification and non-Arab Christians, most of whom are new immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Since they are “sociologically” Jews, this report follows CBS practice and includes them with Jews in all Tables. The Palestinian-Arab population of Israel is classified by the CBS into the three categories of Muslims, Christian and Druze. Currently 84.2% of Arabs are Muslims, and the proportions of “Arab Christians” and Druze are 7.8% and 8.0%, respectively. The important social group of ultraorthodox Jews, comprising about 12.5% of the Jewish population, is not identifiable in CBS publications and the Census public use files.

While the CBS published data do not report all district-specific statistics separately for Jews and Palestinians, this report does provide such data, for the socioeconomic differences between the two national groups are far greater than the gaps between districts. In fact, many of the regional differences in Israel are driven by the population composition of the various regions. In general, the greater the share of Palestinians, ultraorthodox Jews, and Mizrahi Jews in a district, the poorer the district is and the lower the socioeconomic standing of its population.

Population Growth

Average annual population growth for Israel for the period 1948-2012 is very high at 3.7%. It was near 8.2% until 1960, when nearly a million new immigrants accounted for nearly two-third of the total population growth. It declined to 1.8% during the 1980s, but rose again to 3.5% during 1990-1995, when 680,000 immigrants came to Israel. Since 1996 immigration declined, bringing down Israel’s annual growth rate to below 2%. Jewish population growth fluctuates with the ebb and flow of immigration waves. Since 1948 immigration was directly responsible for 35.2% of the growth among Jews, while among Palestinians all growth until 1995, and 96.4% since 1995 was due to natural increase (CBS, 2013, Table 2.12).

The CBS does not provide growth data by districts, except for the current year. We used annual data to construct table 4 for the period 1999-2012. The table presents average growth rates for the various districts for Jews and Palestinians, distinguishing between sources of growth: migration balance and natural increase. For Jews, total migration balance is 23.5% of total growth, and the main component in the migration balance is new immigrants who came to Israel during 1999-2012. For Palestinians, who normally cannot immigrate to Israel due to Israel's immigration laws, total immigration balance for the 14-year period was 3.8% of total growth and the main components are not entirely clear.¹⁸

¹⁸ The main components among Palestinian citizens are most likely returning Palestinian Israelis from abroad, foreign-born spouses of Palestinian-Israelis who were permitted to immigrate to Israel, and non-Arab Israelis (Jews or "others") changing their religion to Muslim (most likely following marriages), thereby becoming "Arabs" by Israel's definition of the "Arab population." There were 6,000 such persons during 1996-2012.

Table 4. Sources of population growth by District and Nationality, 1999 - 2012

District	Population (thousands) at beginning of period	Population (thousands) at end of period	Total growth (thousands)	Annual average growth ¹ %	Migration balance of total growth ¹ %
Total Population	6,041.4	7,984.5	1,943.1	2.0%	18.0%
Jerusalem	717.0	987.4	270.4	2.3%	-2.6%
Northern	1,026.7	1,320.8	294.1	1.8%	4.3%
Haifa	788.6	939.0	150.4	1.3%	12.7%
Central	1,358.2	1,931.0	572.8	2.5%	43.4%
Tel Aviv	1,138.7	1,318.3	179.6	1.1%	-13.5%
Southern	840.0	1,146.6	306.6	2.2%	14.0%
West Bank ²	172.1	341.4	169.2	5.3%	39.6%
Jews, Total	4,936.0	6,337.3	1,401.3	1.8%	23.5%
Jerusalem	516.8	676.7	159.9	1.9%	-10.3%
Northern	509.4	615.6	106.2	1.4%	11.8%
Haifa	624.0	701.8	77.8	0.8%	21.5%
Central	1,251.4	1,772.0	520.6	2.5%	47.4%
Tel Aviv	1,125.2	1,299.8	174.6	1.0%	-14.7%
Southern	737.1	930.4	193.3	1.7%	19.7%
West Bank ²	172.1	341.0	168.9	5.3%	39.6%
Palestinians, Total	1,105.4	1,647.2	541.8	2.9%	3.8%
Jerusalem	200.2	310.7	110.5	3.2%	8.7%
Northern	517.4	705.2	187.8	2.2%	-0.1%
Haifa	164.6	237.2	72.6	2.6%	3.7%
Central	106.8	158.9	52.1	2.9%	4.1%
Tel Aviv	13.5	18.5	5.0	2.3%	30.2%
Southern	102.9	216.2	113.3	5.4%	4.5%

Source: Our calculations based on CBS Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1999-2012 (tables: 2.13, 2.5, 2.4)

¹ Our calculations. Average growth rates are geometric means.

² Including in 1999 6,100 settlers in Gaza Strip. They were not included in calculating annual average growth for the West Bank. If included, the average annual growth for the West Bank is 5%.

Annual average population growth rates for the entire period are higher among Palestinians (2.9%) than among Jews (1.8%), and can be observed in all districts. However, while the Jewish growth rates for 2011 and 2012 are the same as the average for 1999-2012, among Palestinians, the growth in both 2011, 2012 is down to 2.3% reflecting decline in fertility. The two districts/nationalities with the largest growth rates are Southern Bedouins and Jewish settlers in the West Bank, both doubling their population during the 14-year period.

Most of the population growth since 1999, especially among Palestinians, is due to natural increase (births minus deaths) rather than migration balance. Migration between districts is negligible among Palestinians as no more than a few hundreds move between districts each year, with the possible exception of Jerusalem that increased its population by close to 10,000 new migrants since 1999. The Tel Aviv district gained about 1,500 Palestinians due to migration since 1999, which is nearly one third of the total Palestinian growth in Tel Aviv. Jews migrated out of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and moved to other

districts – most notably the West Bank and the Central district, where migration was responsible for 39.6% and 47.4% of total growth in these districts.

Over 3.2 million of Israel’s population in 2012 (40.7%) resided along the coast in the relatively small Tel Aviv and Central districts. However, the population concentration in these districts today is less than it was in 1995 (41.9%) or in 1961 (CBS, Statistical Abstract 2013, Table 2.15), when over half the population resided in these two districts. As the share of the population along the central coast (including Haifa) has declined, other districts’ share of the population has increased. Most of the increases since 1961 have been in the South (from 8% to 14.4%, in large part due to the higher fertility rate of Bedouins), Jerusalem (from 9% to 12.4%, in large part due to the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967), and the West Bank, where 4.3% of the Israeli population resided at the end of 2012, compared to none in 1961 and 2.5% in 1995).

Table 4a. Population (Thousands and Percentages) by Year, Nationality and District

District	1995				2012			
	All	% in District	% Jews	% Palst.	All	% in District	% Jews	% Palst.
Total	5,619.0	100.0	81.0	19.0	7,984.5	100.0	79.4	20.6
Jerusalem ¹	662.7	11.8	72.7	27.3	987.4	12.4	68.5	31.5
Northern ²	952.1	16.9	49.4	50.6	1,320.8	16.5	46.6	53.4
Haifa	740.3	13.2	77.7	22.3	939.0	11.8	74.7	25.3
Central	1,213.2	21.6	91.2	8.8	1,931.0	24.2	91.8	8.2
Tel Aviv	1,141.9	20.3	97.8	2.2	1,318.3	16.5	98.6	1.4
Southern	770.2	13.7	85.9	14.1	1,146.6	14.4	81.1	18.9
West Bank ³	138.6	2.5	100.0	0.0	341.4	4.3	100.0	0.0

Source: CBS Statistical Abstract, 1996 (table 2.5), 2013 (table 2.13)

¹ Including Occupied East Jerusalem.

² Including Occupied Golan Heights.

³ Jewish Settlers in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip (in 1995) and only in West Bank (in 2012).

Notwithstanding the lower population concentration along the central coast today than in 1995 (and 1961), Israel continues to support population dispersion, especially to the “periphery” (as the Northern and Southern districts are labeled) and the West Bank. Part of the reason for the Israeli concern with populating the North and Southern districts is the growing population density in the Central district (Table 5). Population density in Israel is among the highest in the world, and the countrywide figure (353 persons per sq. km) is in fact an underestimate because very few Israelis reside in the Negev desert in the Southern district, which comprises nearly two third of Israel’s territory. The Israeli concern with population dispersion, however, is motivated primarily by Zionist concerns, namely, the desire to maintain a large Jewish majority not only in the entire Israeli territory, but in each and every region. Between 1995 and 2012, when the proportion of Jews in the Israeli population declined from 81.0% to 79.6%, the decline was sharper, about 3 to 5 percentage points, in those districts where most Palestinians reside: the South, the North, and Jerusalem.

Table 5. Land Area (km²) in 2012 and Population Density (persons km²) of Districts by Year.¹

District	Land Area	Density		
		1972	1995	2012
Total	21,643	154.8	247.4	353.1
Jerusalem	653	554.0	1,035.6	1,512.2
Northern	4,473	142.3	211.4	295.2
Haifa District	866	566.5	860.9	1,084.9
Central District	1,294	466.7	953.2	1,492.1
Tel Aviv	172	5,336.7	6,678.6	7,657.5
Southern	14,185	25.1	53.0	80.8

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel no. 64, 2013 (table 2.23, table 1.1).

¹ The CBS does not provide population density for the West Bank. Land Area includes the occupied Golan Heights (1,154 squared km) and East Jerusalem.

Jewish Ethnicity

In 1947 Mizrahi Jews were about 20% of the Jewish population of Palestine. The immigration waves during 1948-1967 had long-term effects on Jewish ethnicity in Israel. Since Mizrahi immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s were younger and had a higher fertility rate than the Ashkenazim, the proportion of Mizrahim in the Jewish population grew, reaching parity with the Ashkenazim in the late 1960s, and maintaining a slight majority until the 1990s (Goldschider 1996; Cohen 2002). In 1983 first- and second generation Mizrahim and Ashkenazim were 44% and 40% of the Jewish population of Israel, respectively, the remaining 16% being third-generation Israelis of “Israeli origin” (Israeli-born to parents who were also born in Israel) of unknown ethnicity.¹⁹ The proportions of Mizrahim in 1983 were lower in the Haifa (34%) and Tel Aviv (39%) districts, and larger in the North (48%) and especially the South (62%) (Sikron 2004).

¹⁹ Origin is defined in Israeli statistics strictly by one’s country of birth, and for the Israeli-born, by the father’s continent of birth. The reliance on an objective definition of country of birth as the sole indicator of ethnicity, together with the decision to trace it back only one generation, results in the elimination of Jewish ethnicity from official statistics within two generations, or about fifty years. Whether such administrative “Israelization” affects identities or changes the role of ethnicity in Israel remains to be seen. So far, available evidence suggests that the role of ethnicity has not diminished, at least with respect to voting patterns and, in particular, in determining social and economic standing. Unlike their Jewish counterparts, Israeli Palestinians are unable to attain the status of having an “Israeli origin” no matter how many generations their ancestors have resided in Israel/Palestine. Until 1995 they were referred to as “non-Jews” and since then as “Arabs,” and they are classified by the CBS according to their religion (Cohen, 2002).

Table 6. Ethnicity of Jews by Year and District (%)

District / Year	1995	2008
Total	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	28.8	24.6
Mizrahim	35.8	26.5
Third Gen & Mixed	22.2	33.0
New Immigrants	13.2	15.9
Jerusalem	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	28.7	24.2
Mizrahim	32.2	23.7
Third Gen & Mixed	30.4	39.6
New Immigrants	8.7	12.5
Northern	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	24.9	23.3
Mizrahim	37.3	27.5
Third Gen & Mixed	21.3	32.4
New Immigrants	16.6	16.8
Haifa	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	35.2	29.6
Mizrahim	29.2	22.2
Third Gen & Mixed	18.7	27.0
New Immigrants	17.0	21.2
Central	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	28.5	24.5
Mizrahim	37.3	27.4
Third Gen & Mixed	22.9	33.8
New Immigrants	11.3	14.3
Tel Aviv	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	34.3	28.9
Mizrahim	33.9	25.7
Third Gen & Mixed	22.8	32.5
New Immigrants	9.1	13.0
Southern	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	17.2	17.7
Mizrahim	46.0	33.1
Third Gen & Mixed	15.0	25.4
New Immigrants	21.8	21.9
West Bank	100.0	100.0
Ashkenazim	29.7	24.8
Mizrahim	27.2	18.2
Third Gen & Mixed	33.6	46.7
New Immigrants	9.5	10.3

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

Definitions:

- Ashkenazim: Born in Europe, America or Oceania or born in Israel to at least one parent who was born in Europe/America/Oceania and no parent born in Asia/Africa.
- Mizrahim: Born in Asia or Africa or born in Israel to at least one parent who was born in Asia/Africa and no parent born in Europe/America/Oceania.
- Third Generation & Mixed: Born in Israel to Israeli-born parents or one parent was born in Asia-Africa and the other in Europe-America.
- New Immigrants: Foreign-born who arrived in Israel after 1989.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1.2 million Jewish immigrants and their non-Jewish family members came to Israel between 1990 and 2008, over half of them arrived in Israel before 1996. Most of the immigrants (75%) came from the former Soviet Republics and Ethiopia (7%). Table 6 lists new immigrants as a separate category for they are not yet viewed in Israel as Ashkenazim or Mizrahim according to their continent of birth, nor do their experiences in Israel resemble those of the veteran Mizrahi and Ashkenazi populations;²⁰ rather, they are referred to in Israel as “Russians” and “Ethiopians.” Excluding new immigrants, the proportions of Mizrahim and Ashkenazim in Table 6 are understandably lower than their share in 1983. However, even if all immigrants are counted as Mizrahim or Ashkenazim by their continent of birth, the combined group of Mizrahim and Ashkenazim (including new immigrants) comprises only 67% of the Jewish population in 2008 (compared with 84% in 1983, and 78% in 1995). The remaining 33% of Jews in 2008 (16% in 1983 and 22% in 1995) were third-generation Israelis (Israeli born to Israeli-born parents), the fastest growing group of Israeli Jews. Third-generation Israeli Jews, whose ancestry is unknown, are younger than other Israeli Jews and therefore comprise a greater share of the population in districts with high fertility rates and large families, namely, Jerusalem and especially the West Bank.

Since educational levels of Ashkenazim are significantly higher than those of Mizrahim, the proportion of Mizrahim in a district is correlated with lower socioeconomic achievements. This is the case in the Southern district where the proportion of Mizrahim is one third of the Jewish population, compared to 18-27% in other districts. Although residential segregation between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews is not nearly as severe as between Jews and Palestinians, many development towns and small localities, especially in the peripheral districts of the North and South are exclusively or almost exclusively Mizrahi.

New immigrants comprised about 16% of Israel’s Jewish population in 2008. They are found in all districts, with the largest proportion (over 20%) in Haifa and the South, and the lowest (10%) in the West Bank, a finding that is consistent with previous research,²¹ but not with the popular (and mistaken) belief that new immigrants from the former Soviet Union disproportionately reside in the West Bank. Finally, low-education immigrants from Ethiopia are concentrated in the Southern and Northern regions, while high-education immigrants from Europe and especially America are overrepresented in the Jerusalem and West Bank districts (Cohen 2009).

Fertility

Israel’s rate of natural increase is among the highest in the developed world. Whether this is due to Israel’s pro-natal policy, is not clear, especially since this policy is limited to Jewish fertility, while Palestinians’ high fertility rate is viewed as a problem.²² In


²⁰ Until 1995 new immigrants from the former Soviet Union were classified as being born in Europe, even if they were born in one of the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.

²¹ See Gillis (2009) for the ethnic composition of settlers in the occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights in 1983 and 1995.

²² See Sikron 2004 and Goldschider (1996) for Israel’s natality policy.

2012, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for the entire population – the number of children the average woman is expected to have during her childbearing years – was 3.05. There are major differences in TFR by district, but most of the territorial differences are driven by the demographic composition of districts and, among Jews, by level of religiosity.

Figure 1. Total Fertility Rates by mother’s religion, 1949 – 2012



Source: CBS Statistical Abstract, 2013 (table 3.13, figure 3.3).

Figure 1 presents the fertility rate by women’s religion over time. The lowest fertility rate is among Russian immigrants with no religious classification, followed by Palestinian Christians and Druze (each about 8% of the Palestinian population of Israel), who reside mostly in the Haifa and Northern districts. The majority of Palestinians in Israel (84%) are Muslims and they have the highest fertility rate, much of it driven by the extremely high fertility of Bedouins, the most impoverished population group in Israel.

Among Jews, fertility rates are lower in the coastal districts where highly educated secular Jews reside. However, even the lowest Israeli rate in the district of Haifa (2.41) is higher than in other developed countries, which are at replacement level or below. Fertility rates among Jews are particularly high in Jerusalem (4.24) and the West Bank (4.97), where the proportion of very high-fertility ultraorthodox Jews as well as other high-fertility religious Jews is relatively high.

In most countries, including Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, rising women’s education, economic development and labor force participation have driven down the birthrate. This appears to be the case in Israel as well, but more so among Palestinians than for their Jewish counterparts. Table 7 presents a steep decline in the fertility of Palestinian women between 1995 and 2012, but not among Jewish women. Among Palestinians, TFR declined from over 4 children per woman in 1995 to 3.32 in 2012. This is to be expected, as the educational attainments of Palestinian women, including Muslims, have risen during this period. Even among high-fertility Bedouin women, the TFR has declined significantly since 1995, although it is still very high in 2012 (5.85). By contrast, among Jews, TFR has increased from 2.62 to 2.95 during this

period. The rise among Jews is observed in all districts, and so is the decline among Palestinians.

Table 7. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Infant Mortality Rate by Year, Nationality and District

District		Total Fertility Rate		Infant Mortality	
		1995	2012	1996	2012
Total	Palestinians	4.06	3.32	10.10	6.60
	Jews	2.62	2.95	5.50	2.60
	All	2.94	3.05	6.90	3.60
Jerusalem	Palestinians	4.20	3.55	9.50	5.70
	Jews	3.76	4.24	6.30	2.70
	All	3.91	4.01	7.40	3.70
Northern	Palestinians	3.71	2.72	9.90	4.50
	Jews	2.60	2.68	5.90	2.90
	All	3.22	2.72	8.50	3.00
Haifa	Palestinians	3.52	2.85	10.10	6.00
	Jews	2.13	2.41	5.80	2.70
	All	2.51	2.55	7.70	3.90
Central	Palestinians	4.04	3.32	7.60	6.00
	Jews	2.41	2.69	3.80	2.30
	All	2.58	2.77	4.40	2.70
Tel Aviv	Palestinians	2.29	2.93	3.80	4.70
	Jews	2.34	2.59	5.60	2.30
	All	2.34	2.60	5.60	2.40
Southern	Palestinians	7.33	5.85	13.10	12.00
	Jews	2.73	2.91	6.20	3.50
	All	3.37	3.46	8.10	6.00
West Bank	Jews	4.73	4.97	6.20	2.50

Source: Statistical Abstract for Israel, 1997, Table 3.9; 2013 Table 3.11.
 Infant mortality rates (per 1,000 births) are average for 1994-96 and 2010-12.

That Jewish rates have not declined in any of the districts, in spite of impressive increases in the educational level and labor force participation of Jewish women in all districts, could be due to the rise in the proportion of religious and ultraorthodox Jews in all districts. Unfortunately, there are no readily available data for the proportion of religious and ultraorthodox Jews in the various districts, with the exception of the settler population, where most ultraorthodox settlers reside in a few homogeneous settlements (the largest of which are *Betar Ilit* and *Modiin Ilit* each with about 50,000 inhabitants). Thus, the increase in TFR in the West Bank, from 4.73 per woman in 1995 to 4.97 per woman in 2012, has been due to the rise in the share of high-fertility ultraorthodox Jews in the settler population, from about 15% in 1995 to about 30% in 2012 (Gordon and Cohen, 2012). In fact, during the past decade, the extremely high fertility rate in the West Bank has been the main source of population growth in the West Bank (Table 4). This is in sharp contrast to the 1980s and 1990s when internal migration from other districts to the occupied West Bank was responsible for most of the increase in the settler population.

In sum, the level of religiosity, rather than labor force participation rates, ethnicity or educational level, governs most territorial differences in fertility among Jews. Among Palestinians, Christian and Druze have “European” levels of fertility, while Muslim fertility in all districts appears to be in decline (similar to the decline in other Middle East countries, including Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza), probably due to rising women’s education, and possibly due to recent reductions in economic assistance to families with children. Interestingly, while religiosity is the main variable explaining fertility among Jews, it has modest or no effect on Palestinian fertility (Okun 2013). Should the observed trends in fertility among Jewish and Palestinian women continue, TFR would soon be higher among Jews than among Palestinians, as it is already in the district of Jerusalem. It will take several decades, however, for these fertility changes to significantly alter the proportions of Jews and Palestinians in Israel. In the short run the younger age structure of Palestinian in Israel (median age of 21 among all Muslims and 15 in the South compared with 32 among all Jews and 19 in the West bank) ensures momentum for future growth of the Palestinian population in Israel despite declining TFR.²³

Infant Mortality

The infant mortality rate for the entire population has declined by about half, from 6.9 per 1,000 in 1996, to 3.6 in 2012. This figure, however, is an average of the low rate among Jews and very high rates among Palestinians, especially in the Southern district. The rate of decline in infant mortality between 1995 and 2012 was similar among Jews and Palestinians, resulting in persistent gaps over time, with the exception of the Southern district, where the infant mortality rate for Jews declined from 6.2 to 3.5, while the rate for the Bedouin population declined only slightly from 13.1 to 12.0. That the Jewish/Palestinian gaps have remained stable or increased between 1996 and 2012 is surprising and disturbing. Infant mortality is a major indicator for general health and wellbeing, and the gap between Jews and Palestinians should have significantly narrowed over time, something that has not happened since 1996.

Education

In developed countries, including Israel, educational levels are arguably the most important indicator for socioeconomic standing. Education is highly correlated with labor force participation, high-status occupations, and earnings, and negatively correlated with unemployment and poverty. Educational levels in Israel are high by European standards, especially among Jews, and they were on the rise between 1995 and 2008. As shown in Table 8, among persons 25-69 years old, the proportion of those with at least a first university degree (BA or equivalent) increased from 19.3% in 1995 to 29.5% in 2008. The proportion of those with less than full high school education decreased during the same period from 32.9% to 17.3%.

The educational levels of the population in the developed districts in central Israel are higher than in the Northern and Southern districts, and not only because Palestinians, with lower education, are concentrated in the peripheral regions (North and South). Even

²³ See Paltiel et al. (2012) for population projections for Israel under various fertility and mortality assumptions.

among Jews, the proportion with at least a first university degree, an educational level that has become increasingly necessary to attain many white-collar jobs, is significantly lower in the Northern and Southern districts, the latter in particular. Moreover, measured in percentage points, the gaps in college graduation of the Jewish population of the two peripheral districts (about 25% in 2008) and the other districts (about 35% in 2008) were greater in 2008 (about 10 percentage points) than in 1995 (about 6 percentage points).

The educational level of Palestinians, particularly in the South, is much lower than that of Jews. Recall that Jews and Palestinians do not attend the same schools, and that state funding of Jewish schools is more generous than for Palestinian schools. In 1995, nearly two thirds of Palestinians (and 75.1% of Bedouins of the South) had less than high-school education, compared with less than a quarter among Jews. And only 6.8% of Palestinians were college graduates, as compared to 21.4% of Jews. Between 1995 and 2008 the educational levels of both Jews and Palestinians increased, but the gaps remained stable or even increased at the top educational level. Specifically, while the Jewish/Palestinian gap in the rate of high-school dropouts has slightly decreased or remained unchanged, the gaps in college graduation rates of Jews and Palestinians, measured in percentage points, increased from 14.6 points in 1995, to 19.8 points in 2008. Moreover, this growing gap is observed in all districts.

Table 8. Educational Levels of Persons 25-69 years old by Year, Nationality and District (%)

District		% Less than High-School		% High School ¹ but less than BA		% with BA or more	
		1995	2008	1995	2008	1995	2008
Total	Palestinians	62.4	45.8	30.8	41.2	6.8	13.0
	Jews	27.8	11.4	50.8	55.7	21.4	32.8
	All	32.9	17.3	47.8	53.3	19.3	29.5
Jerusalem	Palestinians	56.9	44.1	31.6	39.1	11.5	16.7
	Jews	22.7	7.9	49.0	58.3	28.3	33.8
	All	31.5	18.2	44.6	52.9	24.0	29.0
Northern	Palestinians	64.4	45.2	30.2	41.2	5.4	13.5
	Jews	29.5	12.3	53.8	61.0	16.7	26.7
	All	45.1	28.5	43.3	51.3	11.6	20.2
Haifa	Palestinians	60.7	42.2	32.7	45.4	6.5	12.5
	Jews	27.5	11.9	49.6	54.0	22.9	34.2
	All	33.3	18.3	46.6	52.1	20.0	29.6
Central	Palestinians	61.5	42.3	32.7	47.3	5.8	10.5
	Jews	27.6	11.3	51.2	53.5	21.2	35.3
	All	29.8	13.3	50.0	53.1	20.2	33.6
Tel Aviv	Palestinians	49.5	44.5	38.4	43.3	12.1	12.1
	Jews	28.3	11.1	49.7	52.0	22.0	36.9
	All	28.6	11.5	49.6	51.9	21.8	36.6
Southern	Palestinians	75.9	62.1	20.5	31.1	3.6	6.9
	Jews	32.4	15.3	51.0	60.6	16.7	24.1
	All	35.2	20.6	49.0	57.3	15.8	22.1
West Bank	Jews	11.5	4.0	58.7	62.1	29.8	33.9

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

Table reads: in 1995 62.4% of all Arabs had less than high school education, compared to 27% of Jews with less than high school education.

¹11 and 12 years of schoolings are grouped together in the PUF file. Therefore, this category includes persons with 11 years of schooling, while “less than high school” includes persons with less than 11 years of schoolings.

5. Economic Activity

Israel publishes a multitude of economic data, including labor force statistics, national accounts, GDP, and the like. However, the CBS or the Bank of Israel rarely present economic data by districts, let alone for Jews and Palestinian-Arabs separately within districts. There are a few exceptions where data are provided by districts, and they will be discussed below. In addition, we analyzed the 20% samples of the 1995 and 2008 censuses to present labor force statistics – labor force participation rates, unemployment, industrial and occupational distributions and commuting patterns of the workforce – by district and nationality.

Israel’s total Gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 was 630 billion NIS, about 70% of it in the business sector (CBS Israeli National Accounts 1995-2011). Between 1995 and 2009 the economy grew by 72% and the business sector by 77%, from 266 to 473 billion (all figures are in 2009 NIS). Available data by district are for the contributions of manufacturing establishments to the business sector. These contributions declined from 24% in 1995 to 21% in 2009. The data presented in Table 9 reveal major shifts in the

contributions of the various districts over time. While in Tel Aviv manufacturing's contribution decreased by 24%, it grew by 194% in the Southern district, which by 2009 contributed more than any other district to Israel's manufacturing industries.

Table 9. Gross Value Added: Manufacturing Establishments by District and Year

District / Year	Gross value added Manufacturing (NIS million, 2009 prices)		
	1995	2009	% Change
Total	64,232.1	100,090.8	55.8%
Jerusalem	3,419.2	6,228.7	82.2%
Northern	10,943.8	16,714.8	52.7%
Haifa	9,696.9	14,709.8	51.7%
Central	17,180.4	24,620.7	43.3%
Tel Aviv	13,249.9	10,039.3	-24.2%
Southern	9,001.1	26,350.4	192.7%
Ashqelon Sub-District	3,989.8	17,097.5	328.5%
Be'er Sheva Sub-District	5,011.3	9,252.9	84.6%
West Bank	694.3	1,427.1	105.6%

Source: CBS manufacturing survey 1995, 2009; CBS Israeli National Accounts 1995-2011.

The decline in Tel Aviv was driven by the shift in the Israeli economy from manufacturing to services. The huge rise in the South is primarily due to the Intel Corporation. In 2008 it enlarged an already huge high-tech manufacturing plant in *Kiryat Gat*, a development town in the northern part of the Southern District, in the *Ashqelon* sub-district. The manufacturing output of the *Ashqelon* sub-district, where *Kiryat Gat* is located, increased from 4 to 9 billion NIS between 1995 and 2006, and from 9 to 17 billion NIS between 2006 and 2009, whereas the contribution of the southern sub-district of the South (Beer Sheva) remained virtually unchanged between 2006 and 2009 at about 9 billion NIS. Evidently, Intel's plant is responsible for nearly all the rise in the South's output from 2006 to 2009.

Intel's choice to locate its plant in *Kiryat Gat* is revealing. In order to qualify for the tax breaks provided by the government to large multinational corporations, Intel had to locate its plant in an area approved by the government, generally in the Northern or Southern districts. Although locating the factory in an industrial park south of Beer Sheva or in the Northern district would have been cheaper, there were not enough skilled workers, especially engineers, in these districts to fill the many vacancies in the new plant. The choice of *Kiryat Gat*, located about 60 km south of Israel's two largest cities, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (less than an hour's drive), and even closer to Beer Sheva, a city of nearly 200,000 south of *Kiryat Gat*, solved the labor problem. It enables Intel to recruit workers from the four largest districts in Israel where workers of all skill levels reside.

High Technology Sector

The Intel factory is considered a high technology manufacturing plant. Israel's high tech sector is considered by many to be the engine of the Israeli economy. In 2007 it contributed 14% to Israel's GDP and accounted for 47% of all exports, up from 8% and 37% in 1995, respectively (Table 10). In 2007 over 1 of 10 Israeli wage earners was

employed by a high tech firm in services or manufacturing, a higher proportion than in OECD countries.

Most high tech jobs are in the Central and Tel Aviv districts. In 2007, these two districts employed 48.8% of all salaried workers in Israel, but 61.2% of the workers in the High Tech sector. High Tech jobs are available in the North, Haifa and Southern districts, but less so in Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Table 10. Salaried workers in all sectors and in the High Tech Sector by District of Employment (%)

	1995		2007	
	All Sectors	Hi-Tech	All Sectors	Hi-Tech
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
% Palestinians:	13.1	2.7	14.9	4.3
District				
Jerusalem	10.9	8.7	10.2	5.3
Northern & Haifa	25.4	20.3	24.7	21.7
Central & Tel Aviv	48.9	58.2	48.8	61.2
Southern	11.5	11.6	12.5	10.6
West Bank ¹	3.3	1.1	3.8	1.2

Source: Development in the Hi Tech sector in Israel, 1995-2005. CBS Report 1389, 2010, Table 8, 10.

¹ Include "unknown" district

It is unlikely, however, that Intel and other such high tech firms employ many of the poor. Table 10 shows that Palestinians comprised only 4.3% of employees in the High Tech sector, compared with 14.9% in the Israeli economy. As bad as the situation was in 2007, it was not as bad as it had been in 1995 when only 2.7% of Hi Tech workers were Palestinians .

Labor Force Participation

There are major geographical differences in rates of participation in the labor force. Some of these are no doubt due to educational differences between the districts. In Israel, as in other countries, participation rates are positively correlated with educational levels. Thus, for example, the lower participation rate of Jewish men and women in the South compared to the Central, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Northern districts is in part due to the lower educational levels in the South.

However, for the most part, the proportion of low-participation Palestinian women and ultraorthodox men in districts is responsible for the differences in inter-district participation rates. In 2008 the participation rate of all Israelis 25-69 years old was 74.1%. This figure, however, is an average of the participation rates of Jewish men (82.8%), Palestinian men (73.0%), Jewish women (75.5%) and Palestinian women (26.1%). The wide gaps in participation rate between Palestinian women and the three other groups are similar across districts. Hence the lowest participation rates in 2008 were in the Northern district (64.9%), where Palestinians are over half the district's population, and in Jerusalem district (65.2%), where Palestinians comprise 31.5% of the population

and ultraorthodox Jewish men, another group with a low (but unknown) participation rate, are concentrated.

Table 11. Labor Force Participation, for persons 25-69 by Year, District Gender, and Nationality (% in Labor Force).

District		All		Men		Women	
		1995	2008	1995	2008	1995	2008
Total	Palestinians	49.9	49.7	78.3	73.0	21.0	26.1
	Jews	74.0	79.0	81.9	82.8	66.8	75.5
	All	70.5	74.1	81.4	81.1	60.4	67.4
Jerusalem	Palestinians	44.2	47.0	74.2	77.6	14.2	16.3
	Jews	72.3	72.3	77.0	73.1	68.0	71.6
	All	65.0	65.2	76.2	74.4	54.6	56.3
Northern	Palestinians	50.8	51.0	79.7	72.4	21.3	29.2
	Jews	75.0	78.5	82.6	82.3	68.0	74.8
	All	64.4	64.9	81.3	77.4	48.0	52.7
Haifa	Palestinians	54.3	53.9	83.2	77.1	24.5	30.7
	Jews	73.0	78.5	81.2	83.1	65.6	74.2
	All	69.7	73.3	81.6	81.8	58.8	65.3
Central	Palestinians	54.2	52.4	81.8	74.2	26.2	29.8
	Jews	76.4	82.0	84.0	86.3	69.3	78.0
	All	74.9	80.1	83.8	85.5	66.6	74.9
Tel-Aviv	Palestinians	63.6	64.4	78.9	76.4	49.4	49.1
	Jews	73.7	80.4	83.0	84.3	65.6	76.8
	All	73.6	80.3	83.0	84.2	65.4	76.5
Southern	Palestinians	37.1	35.9	61.4	58.6	12.5	14.8
	Jews	70.4	75.9	79.0	80.2	62.3	71.8
	All	68.2	71.4	77.8	77.7	59.1	65.3
West Bank	Jews	83.9	79.5	87.0	79.2	80.8	79.8

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

Between 1995 and 2008, the participation rates of Jewish and Palestinian women increased in all districts by 2-11 percentage points. Most impressive is the rise in the rate of participation among Palestinian women in the North (from 21% to 29%) and Jewish women in the coastal districts of Tel Aviv (from 66% to 77%), Central (from 69% to 78%), and Haifa (from 65% to 75%). By contrast, the participation rates among Palestinian men have declined in all districts, while among Jewish men there was virtually no change in the peripheral districts of the North and South, a slight increase of 2 points in the coastal districts, and large declines of 4 and 9 percentage points respectively in Jerusalem and the West Bank, where the proportions of ultraorthodox Jews have significantly increased since 1995. The decline among Palestinian men is most likely due to the aging of the Palestinian male population that tends to exit the labor force at a younger age than Jews, in part because they are employed in physically demanding blue-collar jobs (Sa'di and Lewin Esptein 2001). While the participation rates of women settlers in the West Bank did not change between 1995 and 2008, the decline in the rate of participation among their male counterparts resulted in a unique

situation among settlers in 2008, which is typical of ultraorthodox Jews in Israel: women are more likely than men to participate in the labor force.

Unemployment

In both 1995 and 2008 the unemployment rates in Israel among persons 25-69 years old were relatively low, around 6.1% in 1995 and 5.4% in 2008. In 1995 the South experienced the highest unemployment rate, 8.4%, and in 2008 the highest unemployment rates were in the North (7.4%) and South (6.6%). These higher rates reflect the lack of economic opportunities in these districts, combined with a higher proportion of Palestinians, and people with relatively low education.

In general, women, especially Palestinian women, are more likely to be unemployed than men. In 2008 Palestinian women in the Northern, Haifa, and Southern districts suffered from a double-digit unemployment rate. The high unemployment rates among Palestinian women probably reflect the lack of suitable jobs in Palestinian villages, given cultural norms against commuting outside Palestinian communities to find employment.

Table 12. Unemployment Rate for Persons 25-69, by Year, District, Gender, and Nationality (% Unemployed)

District		All		Men		Women	
		1995	2008	1995	2008	1995	2008
Total	Palestinians	6.17	8.03	5.16	6.38	10.06	12.73
	Jews	6.13	5.09	4.44	4.77	8.05	5.43
	All	6.13	5.43	4.54	5.02	8.15	5.90
Jerusalem	Palestinians	8.48	5.17	7.86	4.84	11.80	6.73
	Jews	5.35	5.09	4.51	4.84	6.23	5.33
	All	5.89	5.11	5.36	4.84	6.58	5.44
Northern	Palestinians	5.42	8.49	4.38	5.91	9.48	15.02
	Jews	6.12	6.65	4.31	5.88	8.19	7.46
	All	5.88	7.37	4.34	5.89	8.43	9.51
Haifa	Palestinians	6.26	5.60	4.71	3.69	11.84	10.45
	Jews	6.80	5.75	4.99	5.35	8.84	6.16
	All	6.73	5.72	4.93	5.00	9.04	6.58
Central	Palestinians	4.23	5.08	3.34	4.37	7.13	6.95
	Jews	5.63	4.43	3.97	4.17	7.55	4.71
	All	5.57	4.46	3.93	4.18	7.54	4.77
Tel-Aviv	Palestinians	7.14	4.54	6.13	4.66	8.65	4.31
	Jews	5.50	4.59	4.24	4.53	6.93	4.64
	All	5.52	4.58	4.26	4.53	6.95	4.64
Southern	Palestinians	8.94	23.11	7.93	22.65	14.06	24.83
	Jews	8.34	5.57	5.38	5.09	11.98	6.10
	All	8.36	6.60	5.51	6.60	12.01	6.59
West Bank	Jews	5.15	5.36	3.59	4.74	6.92	5.99

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

Palestinian men, with the exception of Bedouins of the South, do not face a greater risk of unemployment than Jewish men. Part of the reason for this seemingly unexpected result

is that Palestinian Israelis are willing to take jobs that Jews view as undesirable, mostly low-paying and physically demanding jobs in construction, services and manufacturing. Yet the very high unemployment rate of Bedouin men (about 23% in both 1995 and 2008) suggests that other factors may also be responsible for it, including greater employment discrimination against Palestinians in the South.

Economic Branches (Industries)

As in most developed countries, the Israeli economy has experienced a shift from manufacturing to services. Between 1995 and 2008 the proportion of the workforce employed in manufacturing industries (including construction) declined from 28.4% to 20.2%, while the proportion in services (both public and business services) increased from 56.4% to 65.5%.

The three districts where employment in services is disproportionately high are Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and the West Bank. In Jerusalem, the capital of the State of Israel, 47.9% of the workforce was employed in public services in 2008, mostly in governmental ministries. In Tel Aviv, the financial and economic center of the country, private firms in finance, real estate, communication, transport, and other business services employed 40% of the workforce in the same year.

The highest share of employment in public services is in the West Bank, where in 2008, one in two settlers (50.7%) was employed in the public sector, either providing services in the settlers' communities or commuting to public service jobs in the other districts. Even as the Israeli government has been eroding the welfare state, it has been recreating it in the West Bank, providing many services (e.g., smaller classes, after-school programs) and subsidies not available in other districts (Gutwein 2004; Gillis 2009). These services are labor-intensive and require workers that are available in the settlements. Indeed, between 1995 and 2008, the share of the workforce employed in the public sector in the West Bank increased by 6 percentage points, more than in any other district.

Industry differences between Jews and Palestinians declined between 1995 and 2008. For example, in 1995 only 26.6% of Palestinians were public sector employees, compared with 33.8% among Jews, a gap of 7.2 percentage points. By 2008 the gap had declined to 5.3 points. The gaps between Jews and Palestinians are greatest in Jerusalem, where Palestinians are not citizens of the State of Israel and are barred from some government jobs. Although Palestinians and Jews increasingly find themselves working in the same broad economic branches, some of the largest firms that provide the best compensation and working conditions have almost no Palestinian employees, generally justifying it due to "security considerations." For example, there are virtually no Palestinians employed directly by the Israeli Electric Corporation, the Israeli Aerospace Industries, and El Al Israeli Airlines. Put differently, although Jews and Palestinians appear to be working in the same broad economic sectors, they are generally not employed by the same firms, nor, as we discuss in the next section, in the same occupations.

Table 13. Employed persons 25-69, by Economic Branches, Year, Nationality and District (%)

District	Year			2008		
	All	Jews	Palst.	All	Jews	Palst.
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	2.5	2.4	4.2	2.3	2.3	2.5
Manufacturing	28.4	27.1	39.8	20.2	19.0	29.0
Trade	12.7	12.7	13.2	12.1	11.8	15.1
Business Services	23.3	24.0	16.4	29.6	30.5	22.2
Public Services	33.1	33.8	26.6	35.9	36.5	31.2
Jerusalem	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	1.1	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9
Manufacturing	18.3	15.3	31.7	13.2	10.8	22.1
Trade	10.6	9.3	16.2	10.7	8.8	17.7
Business Services	23.6	23.9	22.5	27.3	26.4	30.6
Public Services	46.5	50.4	28.4	47.9	53.1	28.7
Northern	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	5.5	6.4	3.8	4.5	5.6	2.5
Manufacturing	37.4	34.2	43.4	28.3	26.3	32.3
Trade	10.2	9.0	12.4	11.0	9.4	14.1
Business Services	15.6	16.5	13.9	21.1	22.2	18.9
Public Services	31.3	33.9	26.5	35.1	36.6	32.1
Haifa	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	2.1	1.6	5.2	1.6	1.3	3.0
Manufacturing	30.9	29.5	40.6	23.8	22.5	30.6
Trade	12.3	12.4	11.8	12.0	11.6	14.3
Business Services	21.0	21.7	16.3	27.4	28.6	20.6
Public Services	33.6	34.8	26.1	35.3	36.0	31.5
Central	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	2.4	2.2	7.5	1.5	1.4	4.0
Manufacturing	28.5	28.1	38.0	18.9	18.7	25.7
Trade	13.6	13.6	14.4	13.4	13.3	18.3
Business Services	23.1	23.5	15.0	33.1	33.4	23.0
Public Services	32.4	32.7	25.1	33.1	33.2	29.1
Tel Aviv	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	0.4	0.4	1.3	0.3	0.3	0.7
Manufacturing	23.1	23.1	31.4	14.1	14.1	19.6
Trade	15.9	15.9	19.7	13.9	13.8	22.9
Business Services	31.4	31.5	23.9	40.5	40.5	35.3
Public Services	29.1	29.2	23.8	31.2	31.3	21.6
Southern	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	5.1	5.0	9.0	4.9	4.8	5.3
Manufacturing	33.5	33.5	33.4	23.9	23.9	22.8
Trade	10.3	10.4	8.5	11.0	10.9	11.9
Business Services	19.7	19.7	21.3	24.4	24.3	25.5
Public Services	31.4	31.5	27.8	35.9	36.0	34.6
West Bank		100.0			100.0	
Agriculture		2.3			2.9	
Manufacturing		22.3			13.5	
Trade		9.4			8.8	
Business Services		21.2			24.1	
Public Services		44.7			50.7	

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

Occupations

Most of the 3 million workers in Israel's workforce are in white-collar occupations. Table 14 presents the occupational distributions of the Israeli workforce by district for both Jews and Palestinians, for three broad occupational groups: Professional, Technical and Managerial (PTM) workers, other white-collar workers (mostly clerical and sales), and all blue-collar workers. On average, those in PTM occupations enjoy better wages and working conditions than workers in the other two occupational categories. In 1995 the Israeli workforce was distributed equally among these three broad occupational categories. By 2008, the share of blue-collar workers had declined by about 8 percentage points, while the share of PTM and other white-collar workers increased by 7 and 1 percentage points, respectively.

There are some regional differences in the occupational distributions, but they are dwarfed by the differences between Jews and Palestinians within each district. In general, the types of available jobs and the general educational level in a district determine its occupational distribution.

As expected, the peripheral districts in the South and North, where the levels of education are lower and the share of manufacturing industries is relatively large, have the highest proportion of blue-collar workers and the lowest proportion of PTM workers. In both districts about one-third of the workforce is in PTM occupations, and one third in blue-collar jobs. By contrast, 40% or more of workers in the other five districts are PTM workers, and only 17-26% work in blue-collar jobs. The ratio of PTM to blue-collar workers is the highest among the settler population, and it increased between 1995 and 2008, reflecting both the lack of manufacturing jobs and the growing availability of public service jobs in the settlements.

In all districts, about half the Palestinians are blue-collar workers, compared to 16-30% among Jews. By contrast, in all districts except the South, Palestinians are significantly less likely than Jews to be in PTM occupations. The figures for the South, showing similar proportions of Palestinian and Jews in PTM occupations, are surprising. Selectivity to the labor force is responsible for this result. Specifically, the low employment and high unemployment levels among Bedouin men and women (Tables 5 and 6) suggest that many Bedouins either get a "good" PTM public sector job in health, education or social services, or stay out of the labor force, or try unsuccessfully to get a private sector job.

The Jewish/Palestinian gaps in occupational distributions ("occupational segregation") have not changed much since 1995. The index of dissimilarity, ranging between 0 (no segregation) and 100 (total segregation), indicates the proportion of Palestinians or Jews who would have to change occupation for the two occupational distributions to be identical. Table 14 reports the value of the index for all districts. The overall level of segregation declined from 29.5 in 1995 to 27.3 in 2008. Segregation is greatest in Jerusalem, where the index has increased slightly since 1995, indicating that the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem is even less integrated in the city now than in 1995. The relatively low occupational segregation in the poor districts in the North and

South is not so much due to Palestinian integration in desirable jobs, as to the fact that in these two districts a higher proportion of (lower education) Jews (compared to other districts) are in blue-collar occupations, where most of the Palestinians are, regardless of their district.

Table 14. Occupations of Employed Persons 25-69, by Year, Nationality and District (%)

District	1995				2008			
	All	Jews	Palst.	Segregation ¹	All	Jews	Palst.	Segregation ¹
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	29.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	27.3
PTM	32.7	34.1	20.5		39.9	41.5	26.8	
Other WC	33.9	35.5	19.5		35.0	36.4	23.8	
Blue collar	33.4	30.4	60.1		25.1	22.1	49.4	
Jerusalem	100.0	100.0	100.0	36.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	38.1
PTM	38.5	42.7	20.0		42.4	48.0	22.2	
Other WC	34.2	36.7	23.4		33.5	36.2	23.9	
Blue Collar	27.2	20.6	56.6		24.0	15.8	53.9	
Northern	100.0	100.0	100.0	20.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	18.4
PTM	25.6	28.2	20.7		33.8	36.7	28.2	
Other WC	26.9	31.4	18.6		30.6	34.0	24.1	
Blue Collar	47.5	40.5	60.8		35.6	29.3	47.7	
Haifa	100.0	100.0	100.0	29.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	24.7
PTM	34.5	36.6	20.7		39.3	41.4	27.1	
Other WC	32.8	34.5	20.9		34.5	36.1	25.7	
Blue collar	32.7	28.9	58.4		26.2	22.4	47.2	
Central	100.0	100.0	100.0	35.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.2
PTM	34.4	35.1	19.6		43.0	43.5	25.2	
Other WC	34.4	35.3	15.5		36.1	36.6	21.7	
Blue collar	31.2	29.6	64.9		20.9	19.9	53.2	
Tel Aviv	100.0	100.0	100.0	29.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	30.2
PTM	34.9	35.1	19.2		44.0	44.1	21.1	
Other WC	39.8	40.0	26.5		39.5	39.5	32.2	
Blue collar	25.2	24.9	54.3		16.6	16.4	46.6	
Southern	100.0	100.0	100.0	21.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	19.9
PTM	25.5	25.6	22.7		32.7	32.8	31.9	
Other WC	30.5	31.0	12.1		34.4	35.3	16.2	
Blue collar	44.0	43.4	65.3		32.9	32.0	51.9	
West Bank		100.0				100.0		
PTM		41.4				48.7		
Other WC		33.5				33.7		
Blue collar		25.1				17.7		

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

¹Index of Dissimilarity for occupational segregation between Jews and Palestinians. The Index ranges between 100 (total segregation) and 0 (no segregation).

Commuting

The industry data presented in Table 13 refer to the district of residence of workers and not necessarily to their district of employment. There is a fair amount of between-district commuting in Israel, much of it short distance between adjacent districts. In general, skilled workers tend to commute longer distances than less skilled workers, for the labor market of the former is national rather than local. For many years, this was not the case in Israel. Palestinians residing in the Haifa and Northern districts were commuting to Jewish communities as early as the late 1960s.²⁴ As late as 1995, Palestinians residing in

Table 15. Percent commuting to work in another district (among total employed) for persons 25-69 by Year, District of residence, Gender, and Nationality

District		All		Men		Women	
		1995	2008	1995	2008	1995	2008
Total	Palestinians	18.1	14.8	20.8	17.4	6.8	7.2
	Jews	18.8	22.1	22.7	26.0	14.4	18.1
	All	18.8	21.3	22.4	24.7	14.1	17.4
Jerusalem	Palestinians	3.6	8.8	4.1	9.9	0.6	3.7
	Jews	6.9	9.7	10.1	14.3	3.6	5.3
	All	6.3	9.5	8.5	12.9	3.4	5.2
Northern	Palestinians	21.6	14.8	25.3	18.1	6.0	6.0
	Jews	11.8	13.7	15.4	17.5	7.6	9.7
	All	15.1	14.2	19.7	17.7	7.3	8.8
Haifa	Palestinians	23.6	23.6	27.3	27.6	8.6	12.8
	Jews	12.2	18.1	15.4	22.7	8.5	13.2
	All	13.6	18.9	17.6	23.8	8.5	13.2
Central	Palestinians	21.5	15.1	23.6	17.5	14.2	9.1
	Jews	33.3	31.4	38.0	34.6	27.7	28.1
	All	32.7	30.8	37.1	33.7	27.4	27.6
Tel-Aviv	Palestinians	8.5	9.3	9.9	11.3	6.3	5.2
	Jews	13.7	20.2	17.8	24.6	9.0	15.5
	All	13.6	20.1	17.7	24.5	8.9	15.5
Southern	Palestinians	7.3	5.4	8.0	6.3	3.2	2.4
	Jews	11.6	12.9	13.9	15.9	8.5	9.8
	All	11.5	12.6	13.7	15.3	8.5	9.6
West Bank	Jews	71.5	56.5	76.5	61.9	65.9	51.0

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

the Haifa and Northern districts had higher commuting rates than Jews (Table 15). Lack of employment opportunities in Palestinian communities, combined with the proletarianization process that followed the confiscation of their land, forced over 25% of Palestinian men in these districts (but only 15% of Jewish men) to seek (mostly blue-

²⁴ In the 1950s and early 1960s Palestinians were not allowed to commute unless they had a special permit from the military governor of their area. This restriction was lifted in 1966 with the end of the martial law to which Palestinian citizens had been subject.

collar) employment in Jewish communities in other districts. By 2008 a lower proportion of Palestinians, especially in the North and Central districts, and a higher proportion of Jews, especially those residing in Haifa and Tel Aviv, crossed district boundaries while commuting to work. Many factors, not mutually exclusive, could have led to this development, including more employment opportunities for Palestinians in the North and Haifa districts (providing services in Palestinian communities to a growing Palestinian population with greater purchasing power than in the past), and improvement in roads and public transportation that has enabled skilled Jews to seek employment outside their districts, or to change residences without changing employment.

Both Jews and Palestinians residing in Jerusalem and the South are less likely to commute, while West Bank settlers experience the highest rate of crossing district boundaries. In 1995, when the settler population in West Bank was less than 135,000, 71.5% of them worked within the “Green Line,” which means that only 28.5% worked in the West Bank. As the settler population increased, and more workers were needed to fill the public sector jobs that were created in the West Bank (in part to attract Israelis to settle there), the proportion of commuters among them declined, but not by much. As late as 2008, over half the women and nearly two-thirds of the men of the West Bank commuted to Israel for employment. Many commuter-settlers reside in settlements near the 1967 border. They moved to the West Bank not so much for ideological reasons as for the generous subsidies and the availability of cheap housing, while keeping their jobs within the Green Line. Apparently, in 2008 as in 1995, there was not much of a Jewish private economic base in services, manufacturing or agriculture in the West Bank that could provide employment to most of the settlers.

Household Income

The income information available by districts is for household income from all sources including work, social assistance, and capital income. Households are divided into 20 income groups, each accounting for approximately 5% of the households in 2008. All income figures are expressed in 2008 New Israeli Shekels (NIS). The figures provided in Table 16 are midpoints of the median category for each district.

The median household monthly income in Israel was 10,093 NIS in 1995. It increased by 1.8% to 10,278 NIS (about 1,900 Euro in 2008 exchange rates) in 2008. In both years, household income was higher in the Central district, Tel Aviv, and the West Bank and lowest in Jerusalem, the South and the North. That median household income increased among the settler population during a period in which the proportion of ultraorthodox Jews increased and labor force participation of men decreased suggests that sources other than labor income are responsible for the rise in their median household income.

Median income tells us about the typical household located in the middle of the distribution. The proportion of households in a district with incomes in the top 10% (decile) of all Israeli households is informative of the inequality level and concentration of wealth and power in the country. By this measure, the Central district stands out as the place where the most affluent Israeli families reside. In 2008, 16.2% of households in this district belonged to the top 10% of all Israeli households.

Table 16. Median Household Income by Year, Nationality and District (all figures are in 2008 NIS).

District / Year		1995	2008
Total	Palestinians	6,988	6,849
	Jews	11,646	11,623
	All	10,093	10,278
Jerusalem	Palestinians	4,270	5,848
	Jews	11,646	10,278
	All	8,541	9,052
Northern	Palestinians	6,988	7,918
	Jews	10,093	11,623
	All	8,541	9,052
Haifa	Palestinians	6,988	7,918
	Jews	11,646	11,623
	All	10,093	10,278
Central	Palestinians	6,988	7,918
	Jews	13,199	14,748
	All	11,646	14,748
Tel-Aviv	Palestinians	6,988	9,052
	Jews	11,646	11,623
	All	11,646	11,623
Southern	Palestinians	5,435	5,848
	Jews	10,093	10,278
	All	8,541	10,278
West Bank	Jews	11,646	13,095

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

The median household income of Palestinian families in 1995 (6,998 NIS) was only about 60% of the median income of Jewish households in Israel, and it did not improve in the following 13 years – in 2008 it was 59%. Median household income among Palestinians is about the same in the North, Haifa and Central districts (close to 8,000 NIS in 2008), and much lower (less than 6,000 NIS) in occupied East Jerusalem where most Palestinians are non-citizens, and in the South where the impoverished Bedouin population resides. The ratio of Palestinian to Jewish income varies from 54% in the Central district to 68% in the North and Haifa districts.

The Jewish/Palestinian gaps in household income are underestimates of the “true” gap in economic wellbeing between the two groups, because they are not adjusted for household size. The average family size of Jews is between 3 and 4 persons, and between 4 and 5 in the West Bank. Among Palestinians the typical family includes between 4 and 5 persons, and over 6 in Bedouin families in the South. Although families and households are not identical, we can safely assume that adjusted for household size, the Jewish/Palestinian income gap is greater in all districts, especially in the South.

Computer and Internet in Households

In 2008 most Israeli households had a computer at home, and the vast majority had an internet connection. Specifically, 75% of Jewish and nearly 50% of Palestinian

households had a computer. The respective numbers for an internet connection were even higher, nearly 93% among Jews and over 73% among Palestinians. There were no major variations between districts with the exception of Jerusalem and the South, where the penetration of computers lagged slightly behind the rest of the country. The low figures for settlers and Jerusalem Jews are due to the large ultraorthodox community in these districts, which instructs its members, for religious reasons, not to keep televisions, computers and internet connections in their homes. Jerusalem's Palestinians, too, are less likely to have computers and Internet connections, but among Palestinians the reasons are most likely to be economic rather than cultural. Bedouins in the South are least likely of all Palestinians to have computers and internet connections, probably because they are poor, less educated, and suffer from the poor infrastructure in some "unrecognized" Bedouin communities and households that at times are not connected to the electric grid.

Table 17. Percent Households with Computer or Internet by Year, Nationality and District.

District		Computer		Internet
		1995	2008	2008
Total	Palestinians	9.9	49.8	73.6
	Jews	30.1	75.0	92.9
	All	27.4	70.8	90.6
Jerusalem	Palestinians	3.8	44.6	62.4
	Jews	33.9	69.4	84.7
	All	26.1	62.3	80.2
Northern	Palestinians	10.9	57.1	78.5
	Jews	28.4	75.5	94.1
	All	21.4	67.5	88.4
Haifa	Palestinians	14.5	57.5	77.0
	Jews	28.6	73.5	94.9
	All	26.5	70.5	92.2
Central	Palestinians	12.7	51.8	75.8
	Jews	35.2	79.8	95.2
	All	33.7	78.5	94.6
Tel-Aviv	Palestinians	13.0	54.9	85.3
	Jews	28.4	74.2	93.2
	All	28.2	74.1	93.1
Southern	Palestinians	4.2	23.5	49.9
	Jews	23.3	71.6	92.4
	All	21.9	64.4	90.1
West Bank	Jews	47.8	80.5	86.6

Source: Israel Census 1995, 2008 (Public use files – PUF).

5. Summary and Conclusions

This report presents and discusses socioeconomic and demographic trends in Israel's seven administrative districts between 1995 and 2012 (depending on data availability, some comparisons use different years). The report follows Israel's definition of its territory and population, which includes not only the territory recognized by the international community but also the entire territory and population of occupied East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, as well as the Jewish settler population (but not the Palestinian population) in the occupied West Bank. Given the well-known socioeconomic differences between Israel's Jewish majority and Palestinian minority, the data for all districts are presented by nationality (Jewish and Palestinian). One advantage of following Israel's definition of its territory is that it enables a systematic analysis of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the settler population in the West Bank.

The Israeli settlement map is informed by four related features governing Israel's territorial policies. These features are not new. They have been shaping Israeli spatial policies for the past 65 years, as well as Israel's settlement project in much of the Occupied Territories since 1967. The first feature is Israel's attempt to Judaize the land. This is achieved by restricting the creation of new Palestinian localities and the attempt to limit the land under Palestinian control and/or ownership. The nearly total freeze in the Palestinian settlement map since 1949 stands in stark contrast to the proliferation of hundreds of new Jewish localities, especially in the North, South, and the West Bank where Jews are a minority and/or their share of the population has declined in recent years. Indeed, as a result of this land regime, Palestinian citizens of Israel are effectively prevented from residing in most of Israel's territory. The second feature is Israel's goal—even if partially unachieved—to create and maintain a solid Jewish majority not only in the country's entire territory (which by Israel's official definition also includes about 70 squared km of the West Bank [annexed to Jerusalem], and the Golan Heights), but also in each and every district. The third is the extreme territorial segregation between Jewish and Palestinians localities, where over 99% of Israel's 1,200 localities in 2012 are either exclusively Jewish or exclusively Palestinian. Finally, there is a systematic preference of Jewish over Palestinian localities in funds and investment in infrastructure. Much of the social and economic gaps between Jews and Palestinians within Israel's districts as well as the differences among districts discussed in this report are rooted in these four related features, which reflect the policies of the Israeli government.

National (Jewish-Palestinian) differences within districts with respect to indicators of well-being, education, labor force characteristics and income reflect districts' population composition. In general, the higher the proportion of weakened groups in a district (Palestinians and especially Bedouin and non-citizens Palestinians, as well as ultraorthodox Jews and Mizrahi Jews), the higher are rates of infant mortality and the lower the educational, employment and income levels. The findings do not point at a systematic reduction in socioeconomic gaps since the 1990s between districts or between Jews and Palestinians within districts. Rather, some indicators suggest that the gaps have actually widened over time. For example, while infant mortality declined in all districts among both Jews and Palestinians, the gaps have not appreciably narrowed in most

districts, and in the Southern district, where the rates are the highest, the Jewish/Palestinian gap in infant mortality has widened significantly between 1995 and 2013.

Educational level is arguably the most important characteristic for socioeconomic advancement. The Israeli population has made major gains in educational attainment between 1995 and 2008. Gaps in high school graduation between Jews and Palestinians have slightly decreased in all districts, especially in the Northern and Haifa districts. However, gaps between Jews and Palestinians in the proportion of university graduates, the educational level that is increasingly required to join the Israeli middle and upper-middle classes, were in all districts greater in 2008 than they were in 1995. Likewise, among Jews, the gaps in higher education between the peripheral districts of the North and South and the other districts have increased between 1995 and 2008.

The two districts along the coast (Central and Tel Aviv) are more developed economically than the peripheral districts of the South and North, as well as the district of Jerusalem, where ultra-orthodox Jews and non-citizen Palestinians comprise (together) over half of the district's population. Although Israel does not publish GDP data by district, the economic advantage of the Central and Tel Aviv districts is evidenced by their occupational and industrial structures (e.g. a lower proportion of blue collar workers in manufacturing industries), and of course, by the higher educational and income levels of their residents.

Commuting to work to a different district, which was in the past prevalent among less educated Palestinian men from the Northern and Haifa districts who were forced to seek employment outside their districts, is now most prevalent among highly educated Jews, and in particular settlers that tend to commute to workplaces outside the West Bank, reflecting the lack of a Jewish economic base in this district. Settlers' patterns of work are unique in other respects: despite their relatively high level of education, their labor force participation rate is relatively low, reflecting the rising share of ultraorthodox Jews among them (reaching about 30% in 2013). Consequently, in contrast to all other districts, labor force participation rate in the Jewish West Bank is greater among women than men. When they do participate in the labor force, settlers tend to work in the West Bank's well-funded public sector, providing educational and other services to the settler population. Finally, and somewhat surprising, average household income among settlers is as high as in the more affluent districts, probably due to the lack of single person households and transfer income from social programs such as children allowances.

Finally, there were some important demographic trends during the 1990s and 2000s. The highest population growth rates between 1999 and 2012 were in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Bedouin population in the South, both growing at an annual average rate of 5.3%, compared to less than 2-3% among Jews and Palestinian in all other districts. Natural increase explains most of these high growth rates, as the settlers of the West Bank and the Bedouin of the South are young and have extremely high fertility rates. Interestingly, since the late 1990s there is a trend towards convergence in total fertility rate of Palestinians and Jews – the rate has been declining significantly

among Palestinians (including those under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), while it has increased slightly among Jews, probably due to the rise in the share of the ultraorthodox population whose fertility rate is very high. The implications of these divergent trends in fertility for the demographic race between Jews and Palestinians cannot be exaggerated, for in the long run they imply a decisive Jewish majority in Israel's territory even if it includes significant parts of the occupied West Bank, which appears to be the territorial goal of right-wing parties in the government, although not the official policy of the government.

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